Option Backdating and Board Interlocks

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2009
Volume: 22
Issue: 11
Pages: 4821-4847

Authors (3)

John Bizjak (not in RePEc) Michael Lemmon (not in RePEc) Ryan Whitby (Utah State University)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine the role of board connections in explaining how the controversial practice of backdating employee stock options spread to a large number of firms across a wide range of industries. The increase in the likelihood that a firm begins to backdate stock options that can be explained by having a board member who is interlocked to a previously identified backdating firm is approximately one-third of the unconditional probability of backdating in our sample. Our analysis provides new insight into how boards function and the role that they play in providing managerial oversight and determining corporate strategy. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:22:y:2009:i:11:p:4821-4847
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29