Can the fiscal authority constrain the central bank?

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Year: 2018
Volume: 89
Issue: C
Pages: 154-172

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) suggests, in its extreme form, that the fiscal authority always constrains central bank behavior. A Fisherian model is used to show that fiscal policy can be irrelevant for the central bank, and that a central bank can act independently, even when constrained to monetize the government debt. In a model with secured credit and scarce collateral, which can explain low real interest rates, the valuation of consolidated government debt needs to account for inefficiency and liquidity premia. The fiscal authority may wish to tolerate inefficiency so as to finance public goods provision.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:dyncon:v:89:y:2018:i:c:p:154-172
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29