Multilateral externalities: Contracts with private information either about costs or benefits

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2016
Volume: 141
Issue: C
Pages: 27-31

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This note uses the framework of Martimort and Sand-Zantmann (2013, forthcoming) about international environmental agreements. The objective is to demonstrate how a shift of private information from cost to benefit affects contracts and permit market outcomes although this seemingly ad hoc choice has no effect outside contracts and absent market interventions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:141:y:2016:i:c:p:27-31
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29