Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
type="main" xml:id="ecin12200-abs-0001"> <p xml:id="ecin12200-para-0001"><fi>This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the true scientific potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium. In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholars' ability to properly assess the scientific value of new ideas</fi>. (<fi>JEL</fi> O31, C72, A14)