The Political Economics of Wackersdorf: Why Do Politicians Stick to Their Past Decisions?

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 1991
Volume: 70
Issue: 3
Pages: 343-50

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The politicians' reactions to changing circumstances appear often sluggish. The decisions about the construction of a nuclear reprocessing plant at Wackersdorf, Germany, provide a recent example. Reprivatization of the company led to an immediate cancellation of the project due to its lack of economics. However, politicians tried (and still try) to save the project, despite a large public opposition. This may be considered as irrational because the politicians apparently account for their past investments. This paper argues that a piecemeal type of a policy is rational if voters honor both credibility and populistic decisions. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:70:y:1991:i:3:p:343-50
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29