Disagreement leads to complete learning: Sequential choice with continuous types

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2008
Volume: 100
Issue: 1
Pages: 53-55

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Players with observable, continuous payoff types choose actions sequentially. Players update beliefs about the payoff-relevant state of nature using private signals and information about previous signals in the history of types and actions. Heterogeneity in preferences ensures complete learning.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:53-55
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29