Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2015
Volume: 159
Issue: PA
Pages: 236-266

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We demonstrate how commodity producers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, producers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete in supply functions. In equilibrium, producers sell forward contracts and buy call options to commit to downward sloping supply functions. Although this strategy is risky, it is profitable because it reduces the elasticity of the residual demand of competitors who respond by increasing mark-ups.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:236-266
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29