An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2011
Volume: 72
Issue: 2
Pages: 558-573

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

eBay's Buy It Now format allows a seller to list an auction with a "buy price" at which a bidder may purchase the item immediately and end the auction. When bidders are risk averse, then theoretically a buy price can raise seller revenue when values are private (but not when values are common). We report the results of laboratory experiments designed to determine whether in practice a buy price is advantageous to the seller. We find that a suitably chosen buy price yields a substantial increase in seller revenue when values are private, and a small (but statistically insignificant) increase in revenue when values are common. In both cases a buy price reduces the variance of seller revenue. A behavioral model which incorporates the winner's curse and the overweighting by bidders of their own signal explains the common value auction data better than the rational model.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:558-573
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29