Prospect Theory as Efficient Perceptual Distortion

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2012
Volume: 102
Issue: 3
Pages: 41-46

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The paper proposes a theory of efficient perceptual distortions, in which the statistical relation between subjective perceptions and the objective state minimizes the error of the state estimate, subject to a constraint on information processing capacity. The theory is shown to account for observed limits to the accuracy of visual perception, and then postulated to apply to perception of options in economic choice situations as well. When applied to choice between lotteries, it implies reference-dependent valuations, and predicts both risk-aversion with respect to gains and risk-seeking with respect to losses, as in the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:3:p:41-46
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29