Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2008
Volume: 98
Issue: 3
Pages: 327-334

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider procurement auctions when bid preparation is costly and shortlisting is adopted. We find that a policy of reimbursing bidding costs is profitable if and only if performance and bidding costs are negatively correlated. Negative rebates dominate positive rebates.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:98:y:2008:i:3:p:327-334
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29