MARRIAGE, MARKETS, AND MONEY: A COASIAN THEORY OF HOUSEHOLD FORMATION

B-Tier
Journal: International Economic Review
Year: 2016
Volume: 57
Issue: 2
Pages: 337-368

Authors (4)

Kenneth Burdett (not in RePEc) Mei Dong (not in RePEc) Ling Sun (not in RePEc) Randall Wright (University of Wisconsin-Madiso...)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This article integrates search‐based models of marriage and money. We think about households as organizations, the way Coase thinks about firms, as alternatives to markets that become more attractive when transactions costs increase. In the model, individuals consume market‐ and home‐produced goods, and home production is facilitated by marriage. Market frictions, including taxes, search, and bargaining problems, increase the marriage propensity. The inflation tax encourages marriage because being single is cash intensive. Microdata confirm singles use cash more than married people. We use macrodata over many countries to investigate how marriage responds to inflation, taxation, and other variables.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:iecrev:v:57:y:2016:i:2:p:337-368
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29