Why (don’t) firms free ride on an intermediary’s advice?

B-Tier
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Year: 2019
Volume: 64
Issue: C
Pages: 27-54

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

When consumers rely on an intermediary’s advice about which firm to buy from but can switch to buying directly after receiving advice, one might expect firms to discount their direct prices to encourage consumers to purchase directly after obtaining advice, thereby avoiding paying commissions. We provide a theory which can explain why firms often do not free ride in this way, as well as when they do. The theory can explain why online marketplaces and hotel booking platforms impose price-parity clauses to prevent such free riding, while insurance and financial advisors do not.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:indorg:v:64:y:2019:i:c:p:27-54
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29