Inequality-seeking punishment

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2010
Volume: 109
Issue: 1
Pages: 20-23

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We report data from a laboratory experiment using dictator games to inform individual preferences over punishment outcomes. We find that many people punish after receiving disadvantageous outcomes, and those who do systematically prefer to use punishment to create self-advantageous inequality.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:109:y:2010:i:1:p:20-23
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29