Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2013
Volume: 77
Issue: 1
Pages: 321-344

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Punishment typically involves depriving violators of resources they own such as money or labor. These resources can become revenue for authorities and thus motivate profit-seeking punishment. In this paper, we design a novel experiment to provide direct evidence on the role punishment plays in communicating norms. Importantly, this allows us to provide experimental evidence indicating that if people know that enforcers can benefit monetarily by punishing, they no longer view punishment as signaling a norm violation. The result is a substantial degradation of punishmentʼs ability to influence behavior. Our findings draw attention to the detrimental effect of profit-seeking enforcement on the efficacy of punishment.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:77:y:2013:i:1:p:321-344
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29