Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
Community-based selection of social program recipients has the potential to benefit from local knowledge about individuals in need. However, this information advantage might be offset by local elite capture and administrative incompetency. Using data from Indonesia's antipoverty program, Inpres Desa Terttingal (IDT), this article investigates which preprogram conditions are associated with community-based targeting outcomes. Results show that wealthier and more unequal villages constantly target better. The findings for inequality suggest that, under certain political and program contexts, any possible influence of local elites might be overwhelmed by the ease of identification of the poor. Evidence is also found that villages with young, educated heads initially exhibit better targeting. However, they lose this advantage as the program design limits the continued monitoring of benefit allocations by the village heads. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.