Online markets and trust

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2022
Volume: 201
Issue: C
Pages: 395-412

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Markets may shape trust and trustworthiness. In this paper, we first report results from a one-shot trust game conducted in a lab-in-the-field experiment with villagers in a rural county in northern China. Experimental results suggest that the experience as online market sellers improves individuals’ level of trustworthiness. To provide more rigorous causal evidence and insights on the underlying mechanisms, we then conducted a laboratory experiment, in which subjects played an infinitely repeated market game with asymmetric information; both before and after the market game, subjects made choices in a one-shot trust game. We do not find that the ex-post choices in the trust game differ between those playing the market game and those conducting a real-effort task instead, except that when the market game does not have a reputation system, buyers become less trustworthy afterward—adding a voluntary reputation system similar to the real-world online rating system help mitigate such a detrimental effect.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:201:y:2022:i:c:p:395-412
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29