Back-Running: Seeking and Hiding Fundamental Information in Order Flows

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2020
Volume: 33
Issue: 4
Pages: 1484-1533

Authors (2)

Liyan Yang (University of Toronto) Haoxiang Zhu (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We model the strategic interaction between fundamental investors and “back-runners,” whose only information is about the past order flow of fundamental investors. Back-runners partly infer fundamental investors’ information from their order flow and exploit it in subsequent trading. Fundamental investors counteract back-runners by randomizing their orders, unless back-runners’ signals are too imprecise. Surprisingly, a higher accuracy of back-runners’ order flow information can harm back-runners and benefit fundamental investors. As an application of the model, the common practice of payment for (retail) order flow reveals information about institutional order flow and enables back-runners to earn large profits.Received July 4, 2017; editorial decision February 12, 2019 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:4:p:1484-1533.
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29