Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2005
Volume: 72
Issue: 1
Pages: 269-286

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

How is it that environmental groups can have a strong impact on environmental policy but without much lobbying? This paper develops a model of "direct" (lobbying the government) and "indirect" (persuading the public) competition for political influence and finds that they are complementary. However, an increase in the effectiveness of public persuasion, or a rise of public environmental awareness, induces substitution between the two. The findings establish that the empirical phenomenon of lack of political contribution from environmental groups may not be related to financial constraints, but to their greater effectiveness in public persuasion and growing public environmental awareness. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:72:y:2005:i:1:p:269-286
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29