International Capital Competition and Environmental Standards

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 1997
Volume: 64
Issue: 2
Pages: 531-541

Authors (2)

Chi‐Chur Chao (not in RePEc) Eden S. H. Yu

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper examines the welfare effects of capital taxation and environmental standards with and without a government spending constraint or international tax credits. This analysis delineates the intricate linkages of the two policy measures to both private income and government welfare. Loosening environmental control leads to more capital tax revenue for the government. The optimal capital tax rate may be of any sign, depending upon the ranking of the weights of government objectives and private utility. The same criterion also applies in determining how stringent the optimal environmental standards should be.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:64:y:1997:i:2:p:531-541
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29