IPO Information Aggregation and Underwriter Quality

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Finance
Year: 2009
Volume: 15
Issue: 2
Pages: 301-325

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A key distinction between some models of IPO pricing (e.g., auctions and bookbuilding) and others (e.g., fixed-priced models) is whether price discovery occurs in the primary or secondary market. Higher investment bank reputation is associated with 1) more active filing price revisions and 2) reduced secondary market volatility, indicating greater resolution of uncertainty before trading begins. Revisions of nonreputable banks cluster on exactly zero dollars. Finally, the "partial adjustment" phenomenon -- often attributed to information aggregation -- is primarily due to the behavior of reputable underwriters. We conclude that theoretical models of primary market information aggregation are better suited for reputable underwriters. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:revfin:v:15:y:2009:i:2:p:301-325
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29