Zone Pricing in Retail Oligopoly

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2019
Volume: 11
Issue: 1
Pages: 124-56

Authors (2)

Brian Adams (University of Akron) Kevin R. Williams (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We quantify the welfare effects of zone pricing, or setting common prices across distinct markets, in retail oligopoly. Although monopolists can only increase profits by price discriminating, this need not be true when firms face competition. With novel data covering the retail home-improvement industry, we find that Home Depot would benefit from finer pricing but that Lowe's would prefer coarser pricing. Zone pricing softens competition in markets where firms compete, but it shields consumers from higher prices in rural markets, where firms might otherwise exercise market power. Overall, zone pricing produces higher consumer surplus than finer price discrimination does.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:11:y:2019:i:1:p:124-56
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24