Anticollusion Enforcement: Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2019
Volume: 32
Issue: 7
Pages: 2587-2624

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider the case of changing competition that comes from stronger antitrust enforcement around the world to show that, as the equilibrium switches from collusion to oligopolistic competition, firms step up investment and increase equity issuance. As a result, debt ratios fall. These results imply the importance of financial flexibility in surviving competitive threats. Our identification relies on a difference-in-differences estimation based on the staggered passage of leniency programs in 63 countries around the world from 1990 to 2012.Received December 12, 2016; editorial decision July 10, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:32:y:2019:i:7:p:2587-2624.
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29