The Role of Effort for Self-Insurance and Its Consequences for the Wealth Distribution

B-Tier
Journal: World Bank Economic Review
Year: 2015
Volume: 29
Issue: suppl_1
Pages: S118-S125

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

I explore the effect of effort as a mechanism to alleviate the idiosyncratic risk faced by individuals in the presence of incomplete markets. I construct a DSGE model where costly effort determines the probability of being employed the next period and a riskless asset can be used to smooth consumption. I first show how effort and assets are inverse related, and that a unique stationary equilibrium exists. Then, in a calibrated version of the model to the US economy, I show that in the stationary equilibrium a positively skewed wealth distribution arises, which is closer to the observed data and has not been obtained by models without ex-ante heterogeneity. I then use the model to evaluate the effect of unemployment insurance on the wealth distribution.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:wbecrv:v:29:y:2015:i:suppl_1:p:s118-s125.
Journal Field
Development
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29