Patience in repeated bargaining: Revisiting Muthoo (1999)

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 75
Issue: C
Pages: 150-153

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The paper shows that Corollary 10.3 in Muthoo’s book Bargaining Theory with Applications (Cambridge University Press, 1999) is incorrect and proves that patience increases a player’s equilibrium share in repeated bargaining situations. It clarifies why a tempting strategy of proof – replacing terms of an expression by approximations with identical limits, then doing comparative statics or taking limits – is flawed and will yield wrong conclusions in other contexts as well.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:75:y:2018:i:c:p:150-153
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29