An axiomatization of multiple-choice test scoring

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2015
Volume: 132
Issue: C
Pages: 24-27

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This note axiomatically justifies a simple scoring rule for multiple-choice tests. The rule permits choosing any number, k, of available options and grants 1/k-th of the maximum score if one of the chosen options is correct, and zero otherwise. This rule satisfies a few desirable properties: simplicity of implementation, non-negative scores, discouragement of random guessing, and rewards for partial answers. This is a novel rule that has not been discussed or empirically tested in the literature.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:132:y:2015:i:c:p:24-27
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29