OPTIMAL ARBITRATION

B-Tier
Journal: International Economic Review
Year: 2013
Volume: 54
Issue: 3
Pages: 769-785

Authors (2)

TYMOFIY MYLOVANOV (not in RePEc) ANDRIY ZAPECHELNYUK (University of Edinburgh)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study common arbitration rules for disputes of two privately informed parties, final offer and conventional arbitration. Conventional arbitration is shown to be an optimal arbitration rule in environments with transferable utility, while final offer arbitration is optimal if utility is nontransferable and the parties’ interests are not too aligned. These results explain the prevalence of both arbitration rules in practice.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:iecrev:v:54:y:2013:i:3:p:769-785
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29