An empirical investigation of late bidding in online auctions

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 117
Issue: 3
Pages: 715-717

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Why do some participants in online auctions place their bids right before the time of closing? Using e-Bay data, we propose count-data models to look at both the presence of the late-bidding phenomenon and its intensity. Our results reveal significant differences between extremely late-bidders (snipers) and moderately late-bidders.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:715-717
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29