The Role of Debt and Perferred Stock as a Solution to Adverse Investment Incentives

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 1990
Volume: 25
Issue: 1
Pages: 1-24

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We analyze the optimal mix of debt, common equity, and preferred equity in a model with an investment opportunity and asymmetric information about its quality, and show that an all-equity financed firm will overinvest. Issuing the appropriate amount of debt before the project becomes available resolves this overinvestment problem. Introducing a second motive for debt, such as taxes, leads to a role for preferred stock as a means of enhancing the firm's “debt capacity,” by creating additional incentives to invest. We derive an optimal capital structure involving debt, preferred stock, and common stock.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:25:y:1990:i:01:p:1-24_00
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29