Career Incentives of City Leaders and Urban Spatial Expansion in China

A-Tier
Journal: Review of Economics and Statistics
Year: 2020
Volume: 102
Issue: 5
Pages: 897-911

Authors (3)

Zhi Wang (not in RePEc) Qinghua Zhang (not in RePEc) Li-An Zhou (Peking University)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the critical role that politics play in shaping the spatial dimension of China's urbanization and the related welfare implications. Utilizing a large data set of residential land transactions matched with city leaders in 200 Chinese cities from 2000 through 2011, the empirical analysis finds that a 1 standard deviation increase in the career-incentive measure leads to 9 additional kilometers of outward expansion, a 23% increase relative to the sample average. It also finds some suggestive evidence pointing to the distortionary impacts of overly strong incentives of city leaders on spatial expansion, consistent with the theory.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:tpr:restat:v:102:y:2020:i:5:p:897-911
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29