Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2008
Volume: 63
Issue: 1
Pages: 406-416

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper presents repeated games with hidden moves, in which players receive imperfect private signals and are able to communicate. We propose a conditional probability approach to solve the learning problem in repeated games with correlated private signals and delayed communication. We then apply this approach to symmetric n-player games to obtain an approximate efficiency result.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:1:p:406-416
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29