The selection effect of quota rationing mechanisms on sales distribution: The convergence of auction and lottery

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2022
Volume: 200
Issue: C
Pages: 803-819

Authors (3)

Hu, Mantian (not in RePEc) Xiao, Junji (not in RePEc) Zheng, Bingyong (Shanghai University of Finance)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Rationing mechanisms are widely used to allocate scarce resources caused by policy intervention. The effect of rationing on equilibrium usually depends on the rationing mechanism. However, stylized facts in the Chinese passenger vehicle market suggest that the quota on license plates shifts vehicle demand to the high-price end, regardless of whether rationing occurs through an auction or a lottery. This study provides a unified theoretical explanation and an empirical analysis for this finding. When the quota allocation process incurs opportunity costs, only the consumers with a high willingness-to-pay participate in the process, which shifts sales distribution to the high-price end.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:200:y:2022:i:c:p:803-819
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29