Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 1995
Volume: 62
Issue: 3
Pages: 425-448

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper focuses on the role of an initial public offering (IPO) in maximizing the proceeds an initial owner obtains in selling his company. In deciding whether to undertake an IPO, and what fraction of ownership to retain, the initial owner must balance two factors. By selling to dispersed shareholders, he maximizes his proceeds from the sale of cash flow rights. However, by directly bargaining with a potential buyer, he maximizes his proceeds from the sale of control rights. Whether a company should be private or public, as well as the insider's ownership in public companies, depends on the particular combination of majority control and dispersed ownership which maximizes the incumbent's wealth. The model provides implications on the strategy to be followed in selling a company as well as on the timing of IPOs and going-private transactions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:62:y:1995:i:3:p:425-448.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29