The “Privatization” of municipal debt

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2024
Volume: 237
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Ivanov, Ivan T. (not in RePEc) Zimmermann, Tom (Universität zu Köln)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the determinants of local governments’ reliance on bank loans using granular data from the Federal Reserve. Governments that are larger, riskier, rely on historically stable revenue sources, or have higher spending relative to revenues are more likely to borrow from banks. Declines in revenues, reductions in bond market access, and relationships with financial advisers and underwriters all strongly predict higher bank loan reliance. While resemblance between bank loans and bonds is limited, loans afford governments significant financial flexibility not otherwise available in the municipal bond market. The frequent loan renegotiation and credit line use are both highly responsive to changes in credit quality, thereby tailoring debt contracts to changes in government fundamentals. The largest entities find this flexibility most useful with nearly 45% of entities in the top revenue quintile obtaining a bank loan by 2017.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:237:y:2024:i:c:s0047272724000926
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29