Fiscal restraint and the political economy of EMU

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 1998
Volume: 94
Issue: 3
Pages: 385-406

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

While the principle of delegation has become well established on the national level for monetary policy, fiscal policies remain in the hands of policy makers depending on rent-seeking interest groups. We argue that the Maastricht Treaty provides a unique international commitment that enables governments to follow restrictive fiscal policies by attributing their negative side-effects to Europe, and to implement austerity measures despite rising unemployment or a decline in growth. Hence, the popularity of the European idea is instrumented to enforce fiscal discipline. The paper outlines the political economy framework and presents new econometric evidence. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:94:y:1998:i:3:p:385-406
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29