Unintended Consequence of Centralized Public School Funding in Michigan Education

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 2005
Volume: 71
Issue: 3
Pages: 534-544

Authors (2)

Ron Zimmer (University of Kentucky) John T. Jones (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

As part of the movement to create greater spending equity among school districts, states have centralized funding for public education and instituted funding formulas where high‐spending districts are often constrained in their operational expenditures. However, these school districts often maintain local discretion over capital expenditures financed by the sale of bonds. In this study, we find that Michigan's high‐spending school districts have a greater probability of issuing bonds after centralizing public school funding, indicating that debt financing of capital expenditures may have become a mechanism to allow these school districts to circumvent the policy's intent for greater spending equity.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:71:y:2005:i:3:p:534-544
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29