Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2024
Volume: 16
Issue: 3
Pages: 178-218

Authors (3)

Martin B. Hackmann (not in RePEc) R. Vincent Pohl (not in RePEc) Nicolas R. Ziebarth (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäisch...)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551,000 nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, due to limited cost-sharing, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their nursing home stays instead of transitioning to community-based care. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejapp:v:16:y:2024:i:3:p:178-218
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29