The Power of Lakshmi: Monetary Incentives for Raising a Girl

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Human Resources
Year: 2025
Volume: 60
Issue: 4

Authors (3)

Nabaneeta Biswas (not in RePEc) Christopher Cornwell (not in RePEc) Laura V. Zimmermann (University of Georgia)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Worldwide, 1.6 million girls are “missing” at birth every year. One policy tool to improve the sex ratio is a conditional cash transfer that pays parents to invest in daughters, but existing evidence on their effectiveness is sparse. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we evaluate the Dhanlakshmi scheme, an Indian CCT program that strongly encouraged girl births without restricting fertility. Dhanlakshmi improved the sex ratio at birth, with only a small fertility increase. The girl-birth effect was concentrated among the first two parities and partially persisted after the program was discontinued. Post-birth outcomes like immunization and education also improved.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:uwp:jhriss:v:60:y:2025:i:4:p:1253-1283
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29