Stable money and central bank independence: implementing monetary institutions in postwar Germany

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2021
Volume: 186
Issue: 3
Pages: 287-308

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract Germany prides itself in having one of the most successful central banks and national currencies with respect to independence and stability. I show that not only were both imposed on the country after 1945, but that German experts and officials resisted both initially. It thus represents a rare case of the successful imposition of institutions from abroad. Events are discussed in light of Peter Bernholz’s requirements of stable money and an independent central bank.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:186:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00734-z
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-02-02