Lying in a finitely repeated game

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2021
Volume: 201
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Ben-Ner, Avner (University of Minnesota) Hu, Fangtingyu (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Do people lie less in repeated interactions with the same partner than in a series of one-shot interactions with strangers? We find that under asymmetric information, senders lie substantially less if paired with the same receiver than when randomly re-matched with different receivers. However, the lying gap diminishes if the receiver is allowed to offer feedback to the sender.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:201:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521000185
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24