Market Making Contracts, Firm Value, and the IPO Decision

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Finance
Year: 2015
Volume: 70
Issue: 5
Pages: 1997-2028

Authors (3)

HENDRIK BESSEMBINDER (Arizona State University) JIA HAO (not in RePEc) KUNCHENG ZHENG (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

type="main"> <title type="main">ABSTRACT</title> <p>We examine the effects of secondary market liquidity on firm value and the IPO decision. Competitive aftermarket liquidity provision is associated with reduced welfare and a discounted secondary market price that can dissuade IPOs. The competitive market fails in particular for firms or at times when uncertainty regarding fundamental value and asymmetric information are large in combination. In these cases, firm value and welfare are improved by a contract where the firm engages a designated market maker to enhance liquidity. Such contracts represent a market solution to a market imperfection, particularly for small, growth firms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jfinan:v:70:y:2015:i:5:p:1997-2028
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24