Forward Contracts and Firm Value: Investment Incentive and Contracting Effects

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 1991
Volume: 26
Issue: 4
Pages: 519-532

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Corporate risk hedging with forward contracts increases value by reducing incentives to underinvest. This occurs because the hedge decreases the sensitivity of senior claim value to incremental investment, allowing equity holders to capture a larger portion of the incremental benefit from new investment. Hedging also allows the firm to credibly commit to meet obligations in states where it otherwise could not, which improves contract terms the firm can negotiate with customers, creditors, and managers. These benefits cannot be duplicated by individual hedging, and each result holds independent of agents' risk preferences.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:26:y:1991:i:04:p:519-532_00
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24