Monopolistic unions, Brainard uncertainty, and optimal monetary policy

C-Tier
Journal: Oxford Economic Papers
Year: 2010
Volume: 62
Issue: 2
Pages: 307-322

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Some authors have argued that multiplicative uncertainty may benefit society as the cautionary motive reduces the inflation bias. However, when there are non-atomistic wage setters, higher multiplicative uncertainty may raise the wage premium and unemployment and thus reduce welfare. Furthermore, since central bank preferences also affect the wage premium, delegating policy to an independent central banker with an optimal degree of conservatism cannot deliver a second-best outcome. Copyright 2010 , Oxford University Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:oxecpp:v:62:y:2010:i:2:p:307-322
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-02-02