Time consistency and time invariance in collective intertemporal choice

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2018
Volume: 176
Issue: C
Pages: 158-169

Authors (2)

Millner, Antony (not in RePEc) Heal, Geoffrey (Columbia University)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Recent work on collective intertemporal choice suggests that non-dictatorial social preferences are generically time inconsistent. We argue that this claim conflates time consistency with two distinct properties of preferences: stationarity and time invariance. While time invariance and stationarity together imply time consistency, the converse does not hold. Although non-dictatorial social preferences cannot be stationary, they may be time consistent if time invariance is abandoned. If individuals are discounted utilitarians, revealed preference provides no guidance on whether social preferences should be time consistent or time invariant. Nevertheless, we argue that time invariant social preferences are often normatively and descriptively problematic.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:158-169
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-02-02