Does truth win when teams reason strategically?

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 123
Issue: 1
Pages: 86-89

Authors (3)

Brosig-Koch, Jeannette (not in RePEc) Heinrich, Timo (Durham University) Helbach, Christoph (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study behavior in the race game with the aim of assessing whether teams can create synergies. The race game has the advantage that the optimal strategy depends neither on beliefs about other players nor on distributional or efficiency concerns. Our results reveal that teams not only outperform individuals but that they can also beat the “truth-wins” benchmark. In particular, varying the length of the race game we find that the team advantage increases with the complexity of the game.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:1:p:86-89
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-02-02