Communication and reputation in procurement auctions — Some empirical evidence

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 114
Issue: 2
Pages: 164-167

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper studies communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement auctions. Positive reputation ratings and engaging in communication increase a bidder’s probability of winning. Messages are primarily used to reduce the asymmetric information associated with transactions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:2:p:164-167
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-02-02