An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic History
Year: 2007
Volume: 67
Issue: 4
Pages: 829-848

Authors (2)

Heckelman, Jac C. (Wake Forest University) Dougherty, Keith L. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Empirical studies of delegate voting at the Constitutional Convention have relied on the same 16 roll call votes. This article re-examines various assumptions used in the collection of these data. We first create a baseline regression. We then consider the effect of dropping delegates not in attendance, re-inferring the votes from primary sources, examining various subsamples of the roll calls, and reconstructing constituency variables to include state districts. Our findings suggest that personal interests were indeed important for decision making at the Constitutional Convention, but constituent interests were less important than previously claimed.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jechis:v:67:y:2007:i:04:p:829-848_00
Journal Field
Economic History
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-02-02