A Spatial Model of U.S. Senate Elections

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2004
Volume: 118
Issue: 1_2
Pages: 87-103

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The importance of primary elections is considered within the context of U.S. Senate elections where senators serve overlapping terms and voters are assumed to balance their two senators against each other. Voters behave strategically in the primaries but convergence to the median position is not achieved except as a knife-edge result. More generally, constraints in the party space prevent the party of the sitting senator from obtaining the median's preference allowing the opposition party to nominate a candidate further away from the median while still capturing the median voter. Empirical evidence supports the notion that senate divergence is a function of the state primary system.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:118:y:2004:i:1_2:p:87-103
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-02-02