Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: A generalization of the serial rule and its characterization

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 54
Issue: C
Pages: 40-47

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study a probabilistic assignment problem when agents have multi-unit demands for objects. We first introduce two fairness requirements to accommodate different demands across agents. We show that each of these requirements is incompatible with stochastic dominance efficiency (henceforth, we use the prefix “sd” for stochastic dominance) and weak sd-strategy-proofness, unless all agents have unitary demands. We next introduce a new incentive requirement which we call limited invariance. We explore implications of these requirements in combination of consistency or converse consistency.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:54:y:2014:i:c:p:40-47
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-02-02