Open banking: Credit market competition when borrowers own the data

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2023
Volume: 147
Issue: 2
Pages: 449-474

Authors (3)

He, Zhiguo (Stanford University) Huang, Jing (not in RePEc) Zhou, Jidong (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Open banking facilitates data sharing consented to by customers who generate the data, with the regulatory goal of promoting competition between traditional banks and challenger fintech entrants. We study lending market competition when sharing banks’ customer transaction data enables better borrower screening for fintechs. Open banking promotes competition if it helps level the playing field for all lenders in screening borrowers; however, if it over-empowers fintechs, it can also hinder competition and leave all borrowers worse off. Due to the credit quality inference from borrowers’ sign-up decisions, this remains true even if borrowers have the control of whether to share their banking data. We also study extensions with fintech affinities and data sharing on borrower preferences.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:147:y:2023:i:2:p:449-474
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-02-02