Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2012
Volume: 74
Issue: 1
Pages: 434-441

Authors (2)

Hommes, Cars H. (Bank of Canada) Ochea, Marius I. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This note shows, by means of two simple, three-strategy games, the existence of stable periodic orbits and of multiple, interior steady states in a smooth version of the Best-Response Dynamics, the Logit Dynamics. The main finding is that, unlike Replicator Dynamics, generic Hopf bifurcation and thus, stable limit cycles, occur under the Logit Dynamics, even for three-strategy games. We also show that the Logit Dynamics displays another bifurcation which cannot occur under the Replicator Dynamics: the fold bifurcation, with non-monotonic creation and disappearance of steady states.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:434-441
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-02-02